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Transnational Competition Law
Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions
William M. Hannay*
I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more U.S. companies engage in overseas operations, even
the most routine merger or acquisition seems to have a transnational com-
ponent which requires analysis and perhaps premerger notification under an
increasing number of foreign "competition laws" (or what we call antitrust
laws). An understanding of those competition rules has become an impera-
tive for American lawyers. 1
While the United States has by far the broadest and most aggressively
enforced antitrust laws in the world, the European Union is now running a
close second, and other countries are beginning to follow suit. Any com-
pany that is involved in overseas operations -- either through exports or
through the activities of foreign subsidiaries or other affiliated companies --
or that is acquiring such a company should include a review of relevant for-
eign merger control laws as a part of its pre-merger analysis.
Some 70 countries around the world now have their own competition
laws that apply to business transactions involving those nations. Regional
* Mr. Hannay is the leader of the Antitrust Practice Group at the Chicago-based law firm
of Schiff Hardin & Waite and is the Immediate Past Chair of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section of International Law and Practice.
'For a comprehensive, one-volume treatise on E.U. competition law, see L. RITTER,
W.D. BRAUN AND F. RAwLrNSON, EEC COMPETITION LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2d ed.
2000). Updated material and information about EU competition law can be found on the
European Commission's Internet website (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/co-
mndg04>.
2In making this assessment, it is wise to retain an experienced antitrust or competition
law practitioner in each relevant jurisdiction - typically, but not necessarily, a foreign attor-
ney.
3As of the end of 1996, 70 countries had a competition law, the majority of which are
relatively new. See Mark Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical
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economic organizations have also established competition law regimes.
The best known of these are articles 81 and 82 of the E.C. Treaty (formerly
articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome), which govern the E.U. coun-
tries.4
II. E.U. COMPETITION LAW
With the growing importance of international markets, many American
firms find themselves subject to foreign competition laws, especially those
of the European Union.s In turn, compliance with those competition rules
has become an imperative for American companies.
A. Overview
The European Commission, through its Directorate General for Com-
petition (referred to as "DG-IV"), is the E.U.'s competition law enforce-
ment agency. The principal rules of competition are set forth in articles 81
and 82 of the EC Treaty (formerly articles 85 and 86 of the 1957 Treaty of
Rome) and in the more-recent Merger Regulation.6 Article 81(1) generally
prohibits concerted market behavior that restricts or prevents competition
within the Common Market.7 Article 82 prohibits the abuse of dominant
position within the Market.8 These rules can be seen as rough counterparts
Analysis, 43 ANTI. BULL. 105 (1998). Palim finds that three-quarters of these laws date from
1980 or later and that the countries with competition laws account for 79 percent of world
output and 86 percent of world trade.4The "Treaty of Rome" refers to the original Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (signed at Rome). Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, (amending original Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Maas-
tricht Treaty]. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, art. 81-82 (former art. 85-86) [hereinafter
EC Treaty]. Article 12 of the EC Treaty provided for complete renumbering of the Maas-
tricht Treaty in accordance with a table of equivalencies included in the treaty's annex.
Throughout the text, all article references (and the use of"EC Treaty") will be to the new re-
numbered articles, which took effect May 1, 1999. Specifically, articles 85, 86, 90, 92, and
93 of Treaty on European Union are renumbered as articles 81, 82, 86, 87, and 88 of EC
Treaty, respectively).5The European Union (E.U.) comprises the European Communities (EC) and the two
intergovernmental "pillars" of the European Union covering common foreign and security
policy and co-operation on justice and home affairs issues. It formally came into being on
Nov. 1, 1993, with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The E.U. consists of Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden.6Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings,
1989 O.J. (L 257) 14 (EEC), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L
180) 1 [hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].7EC Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 81(1).
81d. at art. 82.
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of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; however, there are some significant
difference American lawyers should keep in mind.
B. A Comparison of U.S. and E.U. Merger Policy
Like the U.S.'s Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the E.U.'s merger policy re-
quires parties to transactions above a certain size threshold to notify the
regulator prior to completing the merger or acquisition. In the U.S., the
merging parties must refrain from closing until expiration of a 30-day
waiting period. In Europe, by contrast, a notifiable "concentration" (i.e., a
merger, acquisition, or other consolidation) of two or more "undertakings"
(i.e., corporations or other entities) must not be implemented until it has
been authorized. The Commission, however, must decide either to author-
ize (or clear) the transaction or to challenge it within one month.9 In the
U.S., the waiting period is extended for a somewhat indeterminate period if
the government issues a "second request" for information, while in the E.U.
the time may be extended an additional four months if the Commission ini-
tiates a "second-stage investigation." Both U.S. and E.U. enforcement
agencies have adopted implementing regulations to facilitate the premerger
notification process. 0
The E.U.'s merger policy is set forth in a comprehensive merger con-
trol regulation, enacted in 1989 and substantially revised in 1997. Merg-
ers, acquisitions and certain joint ventures of community dimension, as
defined by quantitative thresholds in the Regulation, have to be notified in
advance to the Commission. The threshold for notification is an aggregate
worldwide turnover in excess of 5 billion Euros (approximately US$5.5
billion) and an individual turnover within Europe in excess of 250 million
Euros (approximately US$275 million) for at least two of the parties to the
merger or joint venture. 12 The Merger Regulation does not require E.U.
9Merger Control Regulations, art. 10, para. 1. The time period extends to six weeks in
the event (1) the Commission receives a request for referral from a Member State or (2) the
parties submit conmmitments intended to form the basis of the clearance decision. Id. Trans-
actions that create or strengthen a dominant position in a distinct market within a Member
State may be referred by the Commission to the Member State for review. Id. at art. 9.
10 Compare 16 C.F.R. § 800 et seq. (implementing regulations to HSR Act's premerger
notification provisions) with Commission Regulation 3384/94, 1994 O.J. (L377) 1; Commis-
sion Notice on the Notion of a Concentration 1994 O.J. (C385) 5; Commission Notice on the
Notion of Undertakings Concerned 1994 O.J. (C385) 31; Commission Notice on the Calcu-
lation of Turnover 1994 O.J. (C382) 15.
"Commission Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertak-
ings, as amended by Commission Regulation 1310/97 of 30 June 1997. It was not until 1987
that the European Court of Justice upheld the Commission's view that article 81 even covers
mergers and acquisitions. See, Case 142 BAT, E.C.R. 4487, (1987) and Case 156/84, R.J.
Reynolds v. Commission, 4 CoMM. MKT. L. R. 24 (1987). The court had earlier upheld the
application of article 82 to mergers and acquisitions. See Europemballage Corporation and
Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission, Case 6/72, E.C.R. 215 (1973).
12Merger Control Regulation, supra note 4, at art.1, para. 2.
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notification if each party realizes more than two-thirds of its community-
wide turnover in a single member state.
If the transaction falls within the scope of the Merger Regulation, the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction, which means that the merger is not
subject to proceedings at the same time under national competition laws.
Transactions that fall below the Regulation's thresholds are subject to re-
view under the various merger control laws of Member States.
In 1997, the E.U. amended the Merger Regulation, effective March 1,
1998. It was recognized that multiple notification of the same transaction
increases legal uncertainty, effort and cost for companies and can lead to
conflicting assessments and that extending the scope of Community merger
control to concentrations with a significant impact in several Member States
would ensure that a "one-stop shop" system applies. The amendment low-
ered the threshold for mergers subject to Commission jurisdiction which af-
fected at least three Member States.
1 3
The E.U. notification must be filed not more than one week after the
conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the ac-
quisition of a controlling interest.'4 As in the United States, failure to file
notification of a merger with Community dimension (or to provide accurate
information in such a filing) can result in substantial fines.'
A merger or acquisition will be deemed compatible with the Common
Market if it does not create or strengthen a dominant position that, as a re-
sult, would significantly impede effective competition in the E.U. The
Commission only initiates an investigation if it has "serious doubts" that the
proposed merger is a concentration that is permitted under the Merger
Regulation. The Commission may then grant either outright or conditional
S3Concentrations will be notifiable to the E.U. if the parties' combined global turnover
exceeds ECU2.5 billion (approx. US$2.75 billion); if each of at least two parties has E.U.-
wide turnover exceeding ECU100 million (approx. US$110 million); if in each of at least
three member states the parties' combined turnover exceeds ECU100 million; and if in each
of the same three states, each of at least two parties has turnover exceeding ECU25 million
(approx. US$27 million). As with the normal threshold rule, the transaction is not reportable
if each of the parties achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turn-
over within one and the same Member State. Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L180),
amending Art. 1, para. 3 of the Merger Control Regulation.
1
4See Merger Regulation, art. 4, para. 1. The formalities of the notification process are
set out in Commission Regulation 2367/90, 1990 O.J. (L 219) 5 (making technical changes
to the Merger Regulation). The parties have to submit numerous facts and information by
using the "CO" notification form.
5Fines can range up to ECU50,000 (approx. US$55,000) for failure to notify or for
submission of inaccurate or misleading information. See Merger Control Regulation, Art.
14. In addition, the Commission can impose fines of at least ten percent of the aggregate
turnover of the firms if they do not comply with decisions made by the Commission.
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clearance, or it may prohibit the transaction. In most cases, the Commis-
sion gives clearance to the merger.16
III. FOREIGN STATE COMPETITION LAWS
While the E.U.'s merger control regime may be the most significant
and far-reaching of its kind (other than the Clayton and Hart-Scott-Rodino
acts), it is by no means the only set of regulations of concern to American
firms. Even within the E.U. itself, the policies and enforcement mecha-
nisms of individual member states may apply to corporate activities. The
laws of several E.U. member states and the interaction between these laws
and the E.U. system itself are, therefore, of more than passing interest to
U.S. corporate counsel. In addition, many nations outside the E.U. have
adopted merger control regulations. Like the U.S. and E.U., many of these
laws have extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Over the past few years, some thirty countries have followed the lead
of the U.S. and the E.U. in imposing mandatory notification schemes on
mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures.1 7 Nine E.U.-member and a dozen
other European countries as well as Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Israel and sev-
eral Asian countries have enacted such laws.
What follows is a brief summary of the merger laws of selected E.U.
member states, including a brief explanation of the relationship between the
member's regulations and E.U. rules, and of the laws of several other coun-
tries of likely interest to American companies).
A. E.U. Member States
1. France
The importance of national competition laws, even within the E.U., is
illustrated by the French competition authorities' decision to block Coca-
Cola's acquisition of the Orangina soft drink brand from the French com-
pany Pernod Ricard in September 1998 and again in November 1999. The
1
6In 1998, for example, the Commission received 238 notifications and initiated only 12
Phase II investigations. Of the nine Phase II cases decided in 1998, five involved clearances
subject to formal undertakings regarding remedies, and in one other, the Commission took
note, in clearing the merger, of certain assurances offered by the parties. In addition, the
Commission accepted formal remedies in the first stage of investigation in 12 cases, as per-
mitted by the 1997 amendments to article 6(l)(b). XXVIITrH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 47, (1998).
17For a more detailed discussion of foreign merger laws, see BAKER & ROWLEY,
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS (1996 & 1998 Supp.), and JOHN
DAVIES, ED., MERGER CONTROL: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MERGERS AND JOINT
VE'ruREs (1997/1998).
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French authorities concluded that the proposed agreement violated French
rules on "concentrations and threatened the domestic soft drink market."18
The source of French antitrust and merger regulation is the Ordinance
of December 1, 1986, and its corollary implementing statute, the Decree of
December 29, 1986.29 The Ordinance created a Competition Council,
which may receive private referrals or complaints as well as referrals from
the Ministry of the Economy. Subject to appellate review in the Court of
Appeals of Paris, the Council handles cartel and abuse of dominant position
cases. 20 Merger cases, however, are the responsibility of the Economics
Minister through the Director General for Competition, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Repression of Fraud.21
Articles 38 and 39 of the Ordinance form the heart of French concen-
tration law. Article 38 provides that any concentration scheme or any type
of concentration which reduces competition may be subject to administra-
tive review, if: (a) it could harm competition, particularly by the establish-
ment or reinforcement of a dominant market position2 2 and (b) the merging
parties including entities to which they are "economically linked"23 either
(i) have had more than 25 percent of their aggregate sales or purchases in a
relevant national market, or (ii) have had an annual aggregate turnover24 in
France of more than seven billion Francs (approximately US$1.2 billion).2 s
Article 39 provides that a concentration results from any act, in whatever
form, which involves the transfer of property or rights with respect to all or
any part of the goods, rights or obligations of an enterprise, or which has as
its goal, or has the effect of, permitting an enterprise or a group of enter-
prises to exercise, directly or indirectly, on one or more enterprises a domi-
nant influence.2 6
The parties to a concentration have the right to notify the Minister of
the Economy of a concentration at any time up to three months before the
18N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1999, at C4; N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at Cl.
19Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986, J.O., 1986, p. 14773, modified by Law
No. 96-588 of July 1, 1996, J.O., 1996, p. 9983 [hereinafter 1986 Ordinance]. The Decree of
December 29 adds nothing substantive to the Ordinance; it merely establishes administrative
procedures and clarifies issues within the Ordinance.
20For more information, see the Competition Council's website (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http://www.finances.gouv.fr/conseilconcurrence>.
21For more information, see the Director General's website (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http:/! www.finances.gouv.fr/DGCCRF/index-d.htm>.
21986 Ordinance, art. 38(1).
23 Economically linked entities include parent companies and subsidiaries, the members
of corporate groups, companies with common directors and companies that have entered into
certain financial and commercial agreements.
24Turnover is roughly equivalent to the proceeds derived from sales less taxes.
251986 Ordinance, art. 38(2).
261986 Ordinance, art. 39.
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closing date.27 Such notification may contain proposed undertakings by the
parties to the concentration to cure potential antitrust concerns. 2 Notifica-
tion is not obligatory;29 however, it does present the advantage of providing
some security from a challenge to the legality of a concentration, because
the Minister may only object to a concentration within a period of six
months following this notification. 0 Following notification, the Minister of
the Economy has two months to render a decision on the transaction. This
time limit may be extended to six months if the Minister decides to request
the opinion of the Competition Council.31 If a merger is referred to the
Council for review, the Minister remains free thereafter to accept or reject
the Council's recommendation.32
2. Italy
Italy is one of the most recent EU member state to adopt national anti-
trust legislation.33 The Italian antitrust scheme is laid out in the Competi-
tion and Fair Trading Act3 4, which closely reflects the principles established
in articles 81 and 82. The Italian law specifically references the EU law
27In their notification to the Ministry of the Economy, the parties to a concentration must
furnish information and documents about: (1) the concentration, (2) the companies which are
party to the transaction or are "economically linked" thereto, (3) the relevant product or
service markets, (4) the geographic scope of the markets, (5) the characteristics of the mar-
kets, including volume and price trends, the identity of the main competitors and their mar-
ket shares, and any barriers to market access, (6) the merging parties' operations, including
market shares, identity of their principal clients and suppliers, distribution agreements, in-
tellectual property rights, R & D expenditures, and advertising. Decree No. 86-1309 of Dec.
29, 1986, art. 28, J.O., 1986, p. 15775.
281986 Ordinance, supra note 19, at art. 40.
291986 Ordinance, supra note 19, at art. 70.
30Even if a concentration has been notified and not challenged, a concentration which re-
sults in an abuse of a dominant market position may be challenged at any time. 1986 Ordi-
nance, supra note 19, at art. 43.
311986 Ordinance, supra note 19, at art. 40. The Council applies a balancing test to de-
termine whether the merger's benefits such as efficiency gains outweigh potential anticom-
petitive harms and must consider various factors including competitiveness of the merging
parties in international markets. Id., at art. 41.
321986 Ordinance, supra note 19, art. 42(1).
33For further information, see the Italian competition authority's website,
<http://vww.agcm.it>.34Law No. 287 of October 10, 1990, [hereinafter the Italian Act], available in the Italian
competition authority website, (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.agcm.it>.35Franco Romani, Commissioner of the Italian Competition Authority, writing on the
subject of the similarity between Italy's 1990 law and E.U. law, has noted that, "it was emi-
nently sensible that enterprises should be subject to the same rules independently of the fact
that a certain practice may or may not have an effect on trade between member countries."
Franco Romani, The New Italian Antitrust Law, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FoRDHAM
CORPORATE LAV INSTITUTE: EC AND US COMPETmON LAW POLICY 481 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1992).
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and states that the Italian competition law "shall be interpreted in accor-
dance with the principles of the European Community competition law. 36
The Italian Act created the Guarantee Authority of Competition and
the Market, an administrative body which is responsible for receiving noti-
fications, providing consultation, and conducting investigations. The
Authority has the power to impose fines for serious infractions. The fines
range from one to ten percent of the enterprise's turnover. The Act's sub-
stantive rules only apply to activities not covered by E.U. regulations, i.e.,
activities impacting only the Italian market. Where the situation at hand is
of Community concern, Italian authorities will forward the matter to the ap-
propriate E.U. authorities. The Act also exempts enterprises which are
granted monopoly powers by legislation (defense and telecommunications,
for example) as well as the media, banks, and insurance companies, which
are subject to industry-specific regulation.
Broadly speaking, the activities prohibited under the Act can be or-
ganized into three categories: (1) restrictive practices; (2) abuse of a domi-
nant position; and, (3) concentrations (mergers, takeovers and joint
ventures). The Act prohibits (and voids) all agreements which prevent or
restrict competition in the national market or a significant portion of the na-
tional market. These rules will not be applied, however, where the other-
wise prohibited behavior results in a substantial benefit for consumers.
Italy has a compulsory merger notification provision which applies to
any merger, takeover or joint venture with an aggregate annual turnover in
Italy of more than approximately US$400 million or if any one of the com-
panies' annual turnover exceeds approximately US$40 million.
3. Germany
Germany's Act on Restraints of Competition 7 ("ARC") was recently
modified and amended.38 The changes only took effect on January 1, 1999,
so there is as yet little beyond the words of the statute on which to base an
interpretation.
Under the revised ARC, a merger can be prohibited only if it is to be
expected that it will lead to or reinforce a dominant position in the relevant
market and if the parties are unable to demonstrate in a "balancing" test that
the transaction leads to improvements in market conditions that outweigh
the disadvantages of market dominance.
1
6Competition and Fair Trading Act, Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990, sec. 1.4 (visited
Apr. 18,2000) <http://www.agcm.itleng/temaO51.htm>.
37 Act on Restraints of Competition Law of August 26, 1998, v.26.8.1998 (BGBI. I S.
2546).




Germany also revised its merger control and notification policies.
Post-merger notification has been abolished because all mergers now need
to be brought to the attention of the Federal Cartel Office prior to comple-
tion of the merger, provided that the relevant thresholds are met. Once the
merger has been completed, a formal notice of this fact must be filed with
the Federal Cartel Office. Pre-merger notification is required if, in the last
business year prior to the transaction, the enterprises involved had a com-
bined global turnover of more than DM1 billion and one or more of the en-
terprises had a turnover in Germany exceeding DM50 million in the same
time period. Specific rules on the calculation of turnover exist for certain
industries, such as television, publishing and financial services.
On the other hand, notification is not required if one of the enterprises'
total turnover was less than DM20 million or if the total size of the relevant
market during the previous calendar year was less than DM30 million.
Likewise, notification is not required unless the merger affects German
markets.
Under section 37, notifications are required in a variety of situations
involving concentrations, or changes in ownership proportion and control
structure, even where control per se is not actually achieved. The exact
criteria are imprecise, but merger notification may be required for acquisi-
tions of as little as a 20 percent interest, if that acquisition constitutes a
competitively significant influence. The merger may not be completed
prior to a clearing decision by the Federal Cartel Office. Clearly, if the
concentration results in the creation of a dominant position in a relevant
market, the proposed transaction will be prohibited, although the Federal
Cartel Office has discretion to allow the arrangement subject to compliance
with conditions established by the Office. Also, the German Ministry of
Economics may overrule a prohibiting decision by the Office if general
public policy considerations are in favor of the merger, regardless of its im-
pact on general market conditions.
4. United Kingdom
While the United Kingdom has a highly elaborate and active competi-
tion regime,39 its statutory structure is currently in a period of transition.
The 1976 Restrictive Trade Practices Act has been replaced by the 1998
Competition Act (the "1998 Act"), which entered into force on March 1,
2000.40 The 1998 Act contains transitional provisions that control until the
new regulations take effect. The Act will be enforced by the Director Gen-
eral of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission, which replaced the
39For further information, see the Office of Fair Trading's website (visited Apr. 18,
2000) <http://www.oft.gov.uk> and the Competition Commission's website (visited Apr. 18,
2000) <http://www.mmc.gov.uk>..40Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976 modified by Competition Act 1998.
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Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Parties who violate the Act are
subject to fines of up to ten percent of annual turnover (in the U.K.), and of
course the voiding of any offending agreements and orders to cease and de-
sist violative behavior. It seems likely that third parties will also be able to
sue directly for breaches of the Act, but the position is not yet clear. There
are no criminal sanctions for violation, unless companies obstruct an inves-
tigation or fail to produce required information upon request.
The 1998 Act is modeled after articles 81 and 82. Chapter 1, like arti-
cle 81, prohibits anti-competitive agreements, 41 while chapter II reflects ar-
ticle 82's prohibition of abuse of dominant position. Despite the intended
similarity, however, compliance with E.U. rules does not necessarily trans-
late to compliance with national regulations.
The 1998 Act did not change existing U.K. law on mergers, and in the
U.K. proposed mergers may be -- but are not obligated to be -- pre-notified
to the Director General of Fair Trading on a prescribed form called a
"merger notice. ' 42 Where a merger notice has been given to the Director
General and no merger reference has been made to the Competition Com-
mission within the period prescribed for consideration of the notice, the
merger is essentially exempt from a later attack. The Director General must
act within 20 business days beginning on the day after the Director General
has received the notice and any fee payable, with possible extensions of up
to 25 business days. The prescribed period may be varied by regulations,
and details of the prescribed form of merger notice are set out in regula-
tions.
B. North America
As signatories to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
United States, Canada, and Mexico are bound to establish antitrust re-
43gimes.
1. Canada
The primary source of antitrust law in Canada is the Competition Act.
44
The Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties, enforceable by the
41 As a general principle, the Act is to be interpreted in a way consistent with the treat-
ment of corresponding questions arising in Community law. See id., sec. 60.42John S. Bridgeman, Director Gerneral of Fair Trading, The New U.K. Competition Act
Speech, March 10, 2000, available at (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.oft.gov.uk>; R.
Finbow & N. Parr, U.K. Merger Control: Law and Practice (1995) at para. 3.020 et seq.
43 Art. 1501 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") requires all sig-
natories to "adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anti-competitive business conduct, and
... take appropriate action with respect thereto." North American Free Trade Agreement, art.




Competition Bureau, as well as private actions. The provisions of Canada's
original competition law (which predated the Sherman Act by a year) were
all of a criminal nature, but the inflexibility of this structure led to substan-
tial amendments in 1977 and 1986. As a result, mergers, monopolies, ex-
clusive dealing, tying arrangements, and a number of other matters are now
treated only as civil violations. From a U.S. perspective, however, a sur-
prisingly large amount of business behavior remains criminalized, includ-
ing horizontal agreements among competitors, price maintenance, price
predation, price discrimination, discriminatory promotional allowances,
misleading advertising, and other consumer protection matters.
The Canadian Competition Act also contains a significant body of
merger regulations, most notably the substantive provisions in section 92
(part VIII) and the pre-merger notification requirements found in part IX.4
These two regulations operate independently of one another. In other
words, a proposed transaction could be subject to the notification require-
ments of part IX without triggering section 92's substantive guidelines, or
vice-versa.
Substantively, a merger may be voided under section 92 if it is found
that the merger prevents or lessens competition, or is likely to do so. Even
where this is the case, however, the merger may be allowed if the parties
can satisfy the efficiency exception contained in section 96, which entails
demonstrating both that the merger will create gains in efficiency which
outweigh its anti-competitive effect and that the increased efficiency would
not be attained but for the merger.
46
Part IX of the Act (sections 108 to 123) establishes a mandatory pre-
merger notification system. Parties may not close the transaction until the
expiration of a waiting period (which varies from seven to twenty-one
days).47 Unlike the U.S.'s Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, there is no mechanism
for mandatory extension of the waiting period to allow further investigation,
but it is not unusual for the parties to agree voluntarily to a reasonable ex-
tension requested by the Commission. The threshold levels for size of par-
ties and size of transaction which bring a particular transaction within the
statute differ among four different categories of transactions identified in
the Act: stock purchases, asset acquisitions, amalgamations, and combina-
tions in an unincorporated form (such as joint ventures). It should be noted
"Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-34, as amended [hereinafter Canadian
Competition Act]. Section 1.1 of the Act describes its purpose as maintain[ing] and en-
courag[ing] competition in order to ... ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have
an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy...." For more information,
see the Canadian competition authority's website <http://strategis.ic.gc.calcompetition>.45See id. at Part IX.
461d. § 96.
47Under statutory amendments scheduled to go into effect in 2000, the waiting periods
will be extended to 14 to 42 days.
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that Section 102 of the Act authorizes the parties to a potential acquisition
to seek, and the Commissioner of Competition to issue in appropriate cases,
an advanced ruling certificate ("AARC") that there is no basis for chal-
lenging the transaction. Since November of 1997, Canada has imposed a
US$25,000 fee in connection with pre-merger notification filings and ARC
requests.
2. Mexico
Mexico's competition legislation is the Federal Law on Economic
Competition enacted in 1992.4 The statute establishes the Federal Compe-
tition Commission and authorizes it to investigate potential violations (on
its own initiative or upon request of an interested party) and assess penal-
ties, including fines and divestitures.
A "concentration" may be challenged by the Federal Competition
Commission if its "purpose or effect is to diminish, impair, or impede com-
petition and free market access regarding equal, similar or substantially re-
lated goods or services."49 Such a situation will be deemed to exist if the
resulting concentration: (1) has the power to fix prices or restrict supply
unilaterally, the entity, (2) intends to prevent access by competitors to the
relevant market, or (3) facilitates engaging in the sort of monopolistic prac-
tices described in Chapter II of the competition law.5
Article 20 of the Mexican competition law establishes pre-merger noti-
fication requirements for mergers and acquisitions which meet any one of
three thresholds:
(1) if the purchase price exceeds 12 million times the minimum general
wage in the Federal District (currently about US$43 million);
(2) if the transaction results in accumulation of 35 percent or more of
the assets or shares of a Mexican entity whose assets or sales exceed 12
million times the minimum legal salary in the Federal District; or
(3) if the entities involved have worldwide annual sales or assets ex-
ceeding 48 million times the minimum legal salary in the Federal District
(currently about US$171 million) and the transaction results in an addi-
tional accumulation of assets or capital stock of a Mexican entity exceeding
4.8 million times the minimum legal salary in the Federal District (currently
about US$17 million).
Within 20 days of the notification, the Commission may request addi-
tional information, which must in turn be provided by the parties within 15
48Ley Federal de Competencia Economica, Diario Oficial de la Federacion, 24 Dec 1992.
The law took effect on June 23, 1993. For more information, see the Mexican competition
authority's website (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://cfc.gob.mx>.
491d. at art. 16 (unofficial translation).
501d. at art. 17.
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days.5 1 The Commission has 45 days from the date of notification (ex-
cluding the time for additional information to be supplied) to make a deci-
sion, which ma be extended an additional 60 days "in exceptionally
complex cases."2 If the time limit expires without a decision by the Com-
mission, it is deemed a favorable ruling, and the transaction may proceed
and cannot thereafter be contested. 3
C. Other Nations
1. Brazil
Brazil has an active competition law regime.54 Brazil's enforcement
has been rigorous relative to other Latin American nations.5 5 The current
competition scheme was passed in 1994 to consolidate existing statutes and
to strengthen enforcement.5 6 There are three agencies that take part in anti-
trust analysis: the agency responsible for monitoring and curbing potential
abuses of economic power is the Conselho Administrativo de Defensa
Econ6mica ("CADE"), an autonomous federal agency under the Ministry of
Justice. The two other agencies are: the Secretaria de Acompanhamento
Econ6mico ("SEAE"), a department under the Ministry of Economy, lo-
cated in Rio de Janeiro, which reviews the cases from an economic view-
point; and the Secretaria de Direito Econ6mico ("SDE"), a department
under the Ministry of Justice in Brasilia, which reviews the acts and trans-
actions from a legal standpoint.57 CADE is the agency responsible for the
final review and judgment. In its enforcement functions, SDE has jurisdic-
tion to investigate potential violations against economic policy, being
CADE the entity responsible for the final judgment on whether violations
have occurred and for the consequent imposition of sanctions, if applicable.
Article 54 of the 1994 law establishes a merger notification system.58
In August 1998, CADE adopted a resolution (No. 15) which established a
51Id. at art. 21 (11). The law provides that this time limit may be extended in duly justi-
fied cases. Id.
-'
2 d. at art. 21 (III), 21 (IV).
" Id. at art. 21 (II), 22 (I).
MFor more information, see the Brazilian competition authority's website
<http://mj.gov.br/cade>.
55Recently, Brazil entered into an antitrust cooperation agreement with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The new agreement, signed on October
26, 1999, contains provisions for enforcement cooperation and coordination, notification
about enforcement actions that may affect the other country, conflict avoidance and consul-
tations with respect to enforcement actions, and effective confidentiality protections.
56Federal Law 8884. Decreto No. 8884, de 11 de junho de 1994, Lex de 6.01.1994
[hereinafter Federal Law].
57William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acqui-
sitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1075, 1092-93 (1998).
"8Federal Law, art. 54.
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new notification form for all reportable transactions. A transaction may be
submitted to CADE before its conclusion, or within 15-business days after
the closing, meaning the moment at which the transaction became effective
in the relevant market. Resolution No. 15 defines this 15-business day pe-
riod as starting from the first binding document signed between the parties,
except when a modification in the competition relations between the re-
questing parties or between at least one of them and a third agent occurs at a
different time. The interpretation that is being given by CADE members
indicates that they consider the trigger day the date on which the relation-
ship between the companies changes from competition to cooperation.
Any transaction involving 20 percent or more of the relevant market
or where any party to the transaction has posted gross revenues in the latest
year exceeding 400 million Reais (about US$250 million) must be submit-
ted to CADE for review. In relation to the billing criteria, CADE takes into
consideration not only the gross revenues of the undertakings, but of their
economic group worldwide. Though rarely invoked in the merger context,
firms must also report any transaction that may restrain open competition or
advance control of a relevant market, regardless of the size of the parties.
Failure to provide timely information on post-closing submission could
result in a fine ranging from 60,000 to 6,000,000 UFIR (roughly US$35,000
to US$3,500,000), as well as the opening of an administrative proceeding at
SDE. As a result of a new law issued by the Federal Government on Janu-
ary 19, 1999 (Law 9781/99), companies submitting notification to CADE
must pay a filing fee of R$15,000, which corresponds to roughly US$9,000.
The Council will authorize a transaction that involves a certain degree
of market concentration, or that is in any way potentially deleterious to the
market, only if the parties can demonstrate: that there will be productivity
gains, that the benefits will be distributed evenly among consumers and
producers, and that competition will not be reduced substantially in the
relevant market. Also, any merger of market-dominant firms intended to
reduce production or impede functioning of a competing enterprise is a
criminal violation.
By means of Resolution 18, issued on November 25, 1998, CADE
grants to every person and/or company, including public entities, the possi-
bility of consulting with the Brazilian antitrust authorities about conduct
and/or mergers. The consultation about conduct may relate either to hypo-
thetical practices or to conduct already adopted by the interested parties.
The answer to this consultation may determine that: (1) the analyzed con-
duct does not contravene antitrust legislation; (2) the hypothetical conduct
would contravene antitrust legislation; or (3) the adopted conduct does
contravene antitrust legislation. In the last scenario, CADE determines
whether the file should be sent to SDE, which will then initiate an adminis-
trative proceeding.
The consultation about mergers may relate only to hypothetical acts
and/or contracts. The answer to this consultation may determine whether
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the hypothetical transaction could be approved by CADE or not. Law
9781/99 states that companies submitting to consultation about hypothetical
transactions must pay a filing fee of R$5,000 which corresponds to ap-
proximately US$2,550.
On June 29, 1999, SEAE issued regulation 39, which establishes an-
other notification form for merger notifications. This form is very exten-
sive and must be presented together with the CADE Form established by
Resolution 15. On August 11, 1999, SEAE issued regulation 45 which
permits SEAE to impose daily fines from 5,000 to 100,000 UFIR (approxi-
mately US$2,500 to 50,000) in case a company omits or refuses to provide
SEAE with requested information, presents misleading information or if
there is an unjustified delay in the production of requested information.
2. Japan
The Japanese Antimonopoly Act was originally enacted during the
American military occupation of Japan following World War 11.59 It has
since been modified on several occasions, but many of its provisions still
resemble U.S. antitrust regulations, in theory if not in practice. The Anti-
monopoly Act is administered by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission
("JcFTC").
60
Under the Antimonopoly Act, a merger or acquisition of stock or assets
is prohibited "[w]here the effect may be to substantially restrain competi-
tion in any particular field of trade" or "where unfair trade practices were
employed in the course of the merger., 61 The JFTC has established guide-
lines for determining what constitutes a substantial restraint for merger
control purposes. Generally, if the market share of an enterprise after the
merger or acquisition will exceed 25 percent, the merger is subject to strict
review (though such transactions are notper se prohibited).
Pursuant to recent amendments to the Antimonopoly Act which be-
came effective January 1, 1999,62 pre-merger notification is required for any
merger involving Japanese companies in which one company has world-
wide assets exceeding Y10 billion (about US$68 million) and the other
59Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansura Horitsu, [Act
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Act No. 54 of
April 14, 1947, 2 EHS No. 2270-79, reprinted in HIOsHI IYORI and AKNORi UESUGI, THE
ANTIMoNoPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 213-65 (1983) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act]. See also
The Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act of 1947, the current text of which is
available in English on the website of the Japan Fair Trade Commission at
<www.jftc.admix.go.jp>.
60Id. at sec. 27(1), at 237.6 1 Antimonopoly Act, art. 15(1) (merger), 10 (stock), 16 (assets).
621998 Amendment Act of the Antimonopoly Act (Law No. 81, 1998) available at
<www.jftc.admix.go.jp>.
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company has total assets exceeding Y1 billion (about US$6.8 million).63 In
the case of foreign companies, any merger is reportable if one company has
sales in Japan greater than Y1O billion and the other has sales in Japan
greater than Y1 billion." Similarly, notification is required whenever a
company with worldwide assets exceeding YlO billion proposes the acqui-
sition of all or a substantial part of the business or assets of a company with
sales or assets in Japan exceeding Y1 billion.65
After notification, the merger or acquisition may not be completed un-
til the expiration of a 30-day waiting period; however, if the Fair Trade
Commission requests additional documentation within the 30-day period,
the period during which a recommendation or a decision to initiate hearing
proceedings can be issued by the JFTC will be extended.66
Stock acquisitions by foreign companies must also be reported to the
JFTC within 30 days after reaching certain levels. 67 This provision applies
when a company with total assets of more than YlO billion (including its
parent and subsidiary companies) acquires stock of a Japanese company
with total assets of more than Y1 billion or stock of a foreign company with
sales in Japan of more than Y1 billion. A report must be filed with the
JFTC within 30 days of reaching each of the following levels of ownership
of the stock of the acquired company: 10 percent, 25 percent, or 50 percent.
3. Australia
The Trade Practices Act of 1974 covers anti-competitive and unfair
market practices as well as mergers and acquisitions. 8 The Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission ("ACCC") is responsible for en-
forcing the Act69, though a variety of other agencies and institutions play a
roles as well.70
63Antimonopoly Act, art. 15 (2).
64Id. at art. 15 (3).
6 1d. at art. 16.
6Id. at art. 15(4), 16.
67Id. at art. 10.
68Trade Practices Act 1974, Austl. C. Acts No. 51, 50 (1974), amended by 5 Austl. C.
Acts No. 222 (1992) [hereinafter Australia TPA]. Note that the Australia TPA underwent
wholesale review in the early 1990's, and was significantly amended in an effort to ensure
that no actor could engage in anti-competitive behavior contrary to the public interest and to
ensure transparency and appropriate prospective review of activities with such potential. For
further information, see the ACCC's website at <http://www.accc.gov.au>.69The ACCC has information-sharing agreements with the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. as
well as several other nations.70For example, the National Competition Council makes recommendations under Part
111A of the Australia TPA (third party access to nationally significant essential facilities) and
the Competition Tribunal deals with applications for review of decisions made by the ACCC




Part IV of the Trade Practices Act bars the following anti-competitive
practices: anti-competitive agreements and exclusionary provisions, in-
cluding boycotts (section 45); misuse of market power (section 46); exclu-
sive dealing (section 47); resale price maintenance (section 48); and
anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions (sections 50 and 50A).
Sections 50 and SA of part IV71 prohibit mergers and acquisitions
which would or would likely substantially lessen competition in a substan-
tial market for goods or services. These sections cover acquisition of shares
as well as asset acquisition, though they only apply to activities in, or that
have an effect upon, substantial markets. There is also an exemption for
mergers or acquisitions which provide a public benefit.
There is no required pre-merger notification provision, but parties are
encouraged to prospectively inform the ACCC of any proposed merger or
acquisition. 72 The ACCC will then consider the likely effects of the pro-
posed arrangement and offer its opinion on the legality of the arrangement.
It should be noted that the notification can be made confidentially, but that
the ACCC will not be able to offer formal prospective opinions about ar-
rangements so notified, because a major part of its evaluative process in-
volves seeking input from other market participants.
With respect to all of the above sections, parties can also seek a formal
decision (authorization) from the ACCC that a particular proposed transac-
tion or activity does not violate the Act. If such authorization is granted,
the party has complete legal immunity with respect to the authorized be-
havior.73 The test for any authorization is essentially whether the activity or
agreement or acquisition benefits the public such that it should be allowed
to occur.
Violations of the Act are punishable in the Federal Court by fines, in-
junctions, damages (pursuant to section 82), divestiture, voiding, specific
performance, rescission or variation of agreement. Actions may be brought
by either the ACCC or private parties.
4. Russia
Russia's basic antitrust statute -- entitled "On Competition and Limita-
tion of Monopolistic Activities on Commodity Markets" -- was originally
71 Australia TPA, section 50 governs acquisitions occurring outside Australia that have
the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market within Australia. Any individ-
ual can bring the matter before the Australian Competition Tribunal and request a declara-
tion that the acquisition has had the effect of substantially lessening competition with no
countervailing public benefit.
72Where the acquiring company is a foreign entity, Australia's Foreign Investment Re-
view Board does require pre-merger notification if the parties meet a AUS$20 million size-
of-person test and if the aggregate value of the target's Australian operations is at least 50
percent of the target's total assets or the target has an interest in Australian urban land.
73Australia TPA, at sec. 88-91.
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enacted in March 1991 and created the Anti-Monopoly Committee
("AMC") at the federal level v4 Local AMC offices were subsequently es-
tablished in each of Russia's 90-odd territories, called "oblasts." Late in
1998, as part of a restructuring of the Russian government, the AMC was
combined with the Russian office responsible for small business into a new
Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy and Entrepreneurship ("Ministry"). The
1991 act blended U.S. and European Community antitrust concepts in ap-
proximately equal proportions, but a major revision to the statute occurred
in early 1995. The revised statute brings Russian competition law some-
what closer to the U.S. model.
Articles 17 and 18 create a pre-merger notification system similar to
the U.S. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. These provisions also establishes a
post-merger notification requirement for smaller transactions. Under Rus-
sian law, companies are required to give advance notice to the AMC when
forming trade associations or when making acquisitions over a certain size.
One key difference is that, unlike American law, Russian law requires the
anti-monopoly authority affirmatively to give permission. 75
Article 17.1 identifies three situations requiring notification and AMC
approval before the transaction can close: (a) the creation or reorganization
of a trade association; (b) mergers where the merging companies' aggregate
assets exceed approximately US$1 million;76 and (c) the liquidation of a
government enterprise whose assets exceed approximately US$500,000 (if
it will lead to the emergence of an entity with a market share in excess of 35
percent). The persons or companies controlling the parties to the transac-
tion must file an application with the AMC that includes information on
their main types of activities and the volume of goods or services in-
volved.7
The substantive standard for evaluating mergers and other transactions
covered by article 17 is set forth in article 17.3 and is similar to that con-
tained in section 7 of the Clayton Act: the AMC may reject the transaction
where "it may lead to the emergence or strengthening of the dominant posi-
tion of the respective organization, and/or to the restriction of competition."
74 Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic On Competition and Restric-
tion of Monopolistic Activities in Commodity Markets, art. 3, reprinted in TRADE &
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE RussIAN FEDERATION: OFFICIAL CODIFICATION & COMMENTARY
(Academy of Jurisprudence of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation et. al, eds.)
(1994) [hereinafter RSFSR Antimonopoly Law].
75Rose Anne Devlin & Sylianos Perrakis, Legislating Competition Policy in the Russian
Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy, ANTITRUST BULL. DEC. 22, 1995, at 903.
76The monetary thresholds for pre-merger notification as well as monetary levels speci-
fied in other sections of the revised law, such as fines and penalties, are expressed in multi-
ples of "minimum wages," a figure periodically established by federal legislation. At the
time that the revised anti-monopoly law went into effect, the minimum wage was 48,000 ru-
bles per month (or approximately US$10).
77RSFSR Antimonopoly Law, at art. 17.2.
Transnational Competition Law
20:287 (2000)
Article 18 provides separate statutory rules for stock and asset acquisitions,
but the notification process and substantive standards are similar to article
17.
With respect to mergers and acquisitions, both articles 17 and 18 per-
mit the AMC to seek the "nullification" of state registration of illegal com-
binations or transactions in "a court of law. 78
IV. CONCLUSION
The key to successful compliance with the antitrust law regime of the
United States and the competition law regimes of foreign countries is to un-
derstand how the various aspects of any particular international commercial
transaction fit into the public policy design of those countries. It is essential
to consider the applicable laws at both ends of the international transaction,
i.e., both at the U.S. end and at the foreign end. While there are many simi-
larities in substance and procedure among all of these systems, the differ-
ences can be significant and can sometimes be outcome determinative.79
78RSFSR Antimonopoly Law, at art. 17.8-17.9, 18.9.79New York University's Prof. Eleanor Fox, for example, argues in Antitrust Regulation
Across National Borders, 16 BRooKiNGs REv. 30, 30-2 (Winter 1998), that the Boe-
ing/McDonnel Douglas merger was treated differently by the FTC (which allowed it) and
E.U. (which challenged it) due to differences in the competition law systems. While U.S. law
is concerned with consumer welfare, E.U. law is also concerned with unfair advantages of
dominant firms. She argues that, following precedent set by its earlier challenge to the Boe-
ing/de Havilland merger, the E.U. Commission was motivated by concerns about possible
future predation by Boeing.
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